

Institution

THE PREVENTION OF CROWD TERROR IN UK: EVALUATING LESSONS,
RESPONSES AND COUNTER-MEASURES

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Executive Summary

Terrorist attacks pose significant challenges to the government of the United Kingdom (UK). The attacks have damaging impacts on the economy, politics, and the social construction of the country. Previous incidents have caused massive destruction of property, injuries, and loss of lives that are detrimental to the development of UK. Economically, the terror attacks have had negative impacts on the key drivers of the UK economy that include sectors like the telecommunication, transportation, and energy. The terrorists also stage their malicious acts to influence the political programs and systems to their favour coupled with other social consequences such as radicalizations. Therefore, this research objects to inform the audience about the trends and targets of the current terrorists in the UK. Preliminarily, the contemporary terrorists target the crowded areas so as to provoke serious attention and cause massive fatalities, casualties, and disruptions (Blackbourn 2011, 131). The study that is based in the UK uses a mixed method strategy that integrates both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The study objects to accept or invalidate the statement that the terrorist mostly targeted the crowded areas like sports events, commercial centres, and visitor attractions amongst others. The results of the study reveal that the more than 73% of the UK citizens often visit crowded areas, and only 41% feel the counterterrorism measures are efficient and effective. Thus, the study provides a deeper understanding of why the terror groups target crowded places. In conclusion, this study recommends new counter-measures would efficiently and sufficiently prevent the terror attacks in the crowded areas.

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1.0. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Overview of the Concepts

Terrorism is still a serious and real threat to the people of the United Kingdom (UK). The attacks could happen at any time and place without prompt warning, which inevitably leads to deleterious impacts. According to Tembo (2014, p. 34), the attacks vary in magnitude that could be measured in terms of purpose and scale. Some terrorism acts may inflict superficial destructions, just draw the attention of people, or lead to public distress. However, other terrorists are driven by the malicious intent to cause massive destruction of property, deaths, damages, and serious injuries (Abbas 2012, p. 164). It is, therefore, evident that terrorism causes massive damages such as disruptions of communication systems, roads, buildings, disruption of nature, and most critically loss of lives (Hoffman 2012, 14). The other critical issue to note is that the consequences of the terrorist acts get more complicated and deleterious if impacted on crowded places and people.

The attacks that take place in the UK and all over the world reveal that most terrorist target places or people that they identify as attractive. That is, terrorists perceive crowded areas as attractive since the concentration of people and property are vulnerable to the attacks. Additionally, the crowded places often lack adequate proactive security measures that exacerbate the vulnerability of the people. As such, the terrorists take advantage and target the crowds so as to cause mass casualties, fatalities, and destructions (Bakker 2015, p. 286). Explicitly, there are many places and events that often become crowded in the UK. According to Tembo (2014, p. 73), the UK citizens always crowd places such as shopping centres, visitor attractions, theatres, and restaurants, education institutions, and worship place. Also, as Murphy (2015, p.13) stated, other places that are often crowded in the UK include commercial centres, major events, health centres, higher learning institutions, and most importantly, sporting arenas and stadia. Undoubtedly, The UK has a complex history of how the terrorist attacks have over the years cause immense damages in sporting arenas and stadia and other crowded places (Abbas 2012, 158).

As a result, this paper uses sporting stadia and arena and other crowded places as the main areas of study that are often crowded and suffer the consequences of the attacks. The primary rationale of the research is to herald a deeper understanding of the behaviours and trends of the terrorists so as to inform the projection of the attacks (Hoffman 2012, 20). Many studies reveal that the UK is a hub of sports that the multiple events attract many people; unfortunately, the terrorists are also attracted to such events. Terrorists are hooligans who have over the years justified their malicious intents to cause havoc to people enjoying themselves in the sporting activities or events (Blackbourn 2011, 133). Therefore, this paper provides a deeper insight of why most terrorists target the crowded locations and inform the security agencies and other stakeholders on the proactive measures. Besides, the study provides the background and foundation for implementing the best counterterrorism measures in the sports arenas and other crowded areas. As Tembo (2014, p. 31) explained, the best countermeasures to combat terrorism should prioritize on protecting people and property, which means that the effectiveness of counterterrorism should be wholesomely measurable.

1.2. Background Study

Overly, UK faces serious and real terrorist challenges, particularly in the crowded sporting events. The sports security has been a complex issue in the UK as the history reveals how security lapses have led to grave repercussions and regrets (Foley 2013, 22). Notably, the impact of the terrorism has resulted in significant challenges for the UK governments over the last 20-30 years. Many tragedies have occurred in the previous years that have informed

many studies including this one. The most conspicuous soccer tragedy took place in 1989, which was later dubbed as the Hillsborough disaster (Leppard 2005, p. 91). The disaster prompted the government of Britain and other security agencies to formulate, enact, and enforce the security and safety standards, policies, and legislations (Walker, Carlile, McDonald, & Omand 2011, p. 81). The Hillsborough disaster resulted in so many injuries and deaths in a single match that served as a wake-up call for the government, civil societies, security agencies, and organizations, and the public to support the enactment of the security standards (Blackbourn 2011, 138). It is very unfortunately and inerasable that the single incident led to 766 injuries and 96 deaths (Leppard 2005, p. 90).

The previous terrorist attacks in the crowds like sporting arenas and stadia have elicited the question and doubt about the UK crowd and risk management systems. As Murphy (2015, p.11-14) pointed out, the essence of crowd management systems is to ensure adequate and reliable security services are provided in the crowded areas mainly to protect against the threats of terrorism. Fortunately, the UK government and other security entities have implemented or supported the implementation of better strategies and crowd management practices, and legislations to counter terrorism (Kral & Urbanek 2014, p. 142). Nevertheless, a lot still need to be actualized so as to wipe out the recurring threats and terrorist acts. Most importantly, there is a need to beef up security measures in crowded sporting events, which have over the years shown the greatest vulnerability. The sports organizations should work closely with the government and all the security and antiterrorism agencies to always ensure that the prior security arrangements are integrated into the planning and organizations of the events (Abbas 2012, 137).

According to Murphy (2015, p.24), the crowds like sporting stadia in the UK often become crowded if the organizers conduct floppy and deadly regularities. Such irregularities and poor arrangements results in security loopholes that paradoxically act as opportunities for the terrorists to execute their unfounded and malevolent acts. Therefore, critical considerations should be made so as to manage the sports events and reduce the incidences of terrorism. The security organizations and the organizers of the events should not take chances, but ensure detailed security measures get implemented before the events occur. The terrorist attacks that have taken place at the crowds as sporting arenas and stadia have resulted in many casualties and fatalities (Foley 2013, 27). The unfortunate incidences of terrorists are either organized by the perpetrators or take place spontaneously. Therefore, the best counterterrorism approach should be protecting the most vulnerable people and places. The crowded areas and specifically sports events are very valuable; thus, suffers the hugest consequences in case of a terrorist attack (Bakker 2015, p. 294). As a result, the security services should strive to protect the citizens through addressing all the issues that might endanger them.

The counterterrorism measures and crowd management systems require an allotment of necessary resources and devotion of the security attention (Kral & Urbanek 2014, p. 144). The expensive material and human resources to offer the appropriate counterterrorism measures and security obligations have posed more challenges to the implementers of the counter strategies (Leppard 2005, p. 93). Many attacks that have occurred in the UK can be attributed to inadequate allocation of security personnel and all the relevant requisitions for proper security. Therefore, the event managers should cooperate with the other key security sectors to ensure that appropriate and adequate personnel and resources are distributed for the protection of the public against the terrorists (Blackbourn 2011, 139).

The UK government established the National Counterterrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) to

implement all the counterterrorism measures (Kral & Urbanek 2014, p. 145). NaCTSO uses well-defined and designed counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) that outlines the best recommendations to apply so as to defeat the terrorists (Blackbourn 2011, 137). One of the primary objectives of CONTEST is to ensure that proactive security measures are used in crowded areas. In other words, NaCTSO has acknowledged that the crowded areas are the major targets of the terrorists; thus, improving proactive security measures is imperative (Abbas 2012, p. 161). The bureau also understands that protecting the crowded reduces their vulnerabilities while increasing the resilience to terrorist attacks. The CONTEST has enhanced cooperation of the police with the government departments and other organizations. Therefore, it is obvious that CONTEST has fostered collective implementation of counterterrorism strategies to protect the vulnerable groups from the dire consequences of the attacks (Bakker 2015, p. 298).

According to CONTEST's provisions, the crowded places include sports stadia, shopping centres, visitor attractions, pubs, parks, and bars (Kral & Urbanek 2014, p. 146). Such places are attractive targets for the terrorists who strive to cause the most traumatizing and deleterious impacts. Therefore, it is necessary for the stakeholders to offer the best security services to the vulnerable crowds. The core objectives of implementing the counterterrorism strategies are to protect the public from the threats and likelihood of the criminal attacks (Bakker 2015, p. 283). Additionally, it is essential for improving the awareness and preparedness of the public and institution of early warning systems. It is real that UK faces serious and multiple terrorist threats, which call for the adoption and revitalization of the security systems to battle the terrorists better (Morgenstern & Falk 2009, p. 101). Therefore, this paper is based on the terrorist cases in the UK, which practically targets to the crowded areas such as sporting arenas and stadia.

The UK event agencies like sports organizations have reported many instances of terrorism threats. In 2004 after the bombing of Madrid, a chief constable who was a terrorism expert warned terrorist attacks on the Millennium Stadium in Britain (Kral & Urbanek 2014, p. 144). The stadium has a high profile, and its attack would mean massive destructions. That was the first indication of the presence of a terrorist who mainly targets the crowded events. Later in April 2004, another terrorist threat to the match between Manchester United and Liverpool was thwarted. In 2007, another terrorist threat was directed to Liverpool Football Club where their stadium in Stanley Park was targeted (Bakker 2015, p. 284). The cases in England provide the insight of how the internal and external terrorists that target the UK mainly focus on destroying the mass in crowded places. Therefore, this research provides the basis for understanding the interest of the terrorists that help the security agencies to project and prepare for the attacks. The NaCTSO should, therefore, operate jointly with the police department and other security agencies to ensure that the public is safe, particularly in the crowded places (Blackbourn 2011, 135).

1.3. Problem Statement

The government of UK has worked tirelessly with other security entities to reduce or curb the terrorist threats and attacks. It is apparent that the current terrorists target the congested places such as sports stadia so as to provoke the highest attention and detrimental consequences. Therefore, it is imperative for the security services to adopt mechanisms that adequately address the challenges caused by the attacks. The government of UK, civil societies, private sectors, and security agencies amongst other stakeholders have cooperated and achieved commended results in tackling the threat of terrorism (Abbas 2012, 142). Despite the many interventions to protect the citizens from the attacks, little has been done in

the prevention of the terrorism in the crowded area. Most researchers and policymakers have also analysed and evaluated the counterterrorism strategies in the UK; however, the specification in crowded areas has been limitedly tackled. Therefore, this research exploits a unique ground that many previous researchers have not conclusively revealed.

The study provides new knowledge on how the prevention of the terrorist attacks can be prioritized to the crowded places. As aforementioned, the crowded places such as sports stadia and arenas are vulnerable for terrorism attacks. Therefore, this research informs the policymakers, security agencies, and other counterterrorism experts that it is important to implement stringent preventive measures in the crowded areas (Bakker 2015, p. 287). Undeniably, many studies have identified the best counterterrorism strategies, but little has been achieved in understanding the dynamics of the current terrorism acts. As a result, this research goes a notch higher to explore how the counterterrorism measures could be used to protect the most vulnerable groups, the crowded areas. The study fills the knowledge gap on how terrorism can be prevented in the crowded areas through understanding the behaviours of the terrorists and informing the projection and warning the attacks (Leppard 2005, p. 96).

1.4. Aims of the study

The primary purpose of the study is to provide evidence-based explanations of how terrorism in crowded areas can be prevented. Additionally, the research helps the audience to understand why the terrorist criminals target the crowded places. Such understanding is essential for recommending the best response strategies that can be used to reduce the terrorist threats. Also, the study provides a deeper understanding of the relationship between terrorist attacks and the locational variables. It also reveals how the facilities such as security services, infrastructure, and contingency plans can be used to prevent terrorism threats to the crowded areas.

The research also aims to inform the audience how the legal authorities and agencies can devise new strategies for combating the unscrupulous acts of terrorism, particularly in the crowded areas. By understanding the behaviours, patterns, and trends of the terrorists, it will be easy to track their operations and organizations and avoid the attacks by instituting the proactive security systems (Hoffman 2012, 16). Accordingly, the objectives of the study provide a deeper understanding of the terrorist threats and how they can be effectively prevented. The empirical aim of the study is to propose the best intervention modalities that the security agencies should adopt to prevent the terrorist attacks in crowded places. The aims of the study can be achieved by using the following guideline objectives.

1.5. Objectives of the Study

1.5.1. Main Objectives

1. To assess and evaluate the counterterrorism strategies which are used in the UK to protect the crowded areas from terrorist attacks
2. To explore a deeper understanding of the patterns and trends of the terrorists that inflicts the UK so as to devise the best interventions to protect the public.

1.5.2. Specific Objectives

1. To investigate is there is any relationship between the terrorist acts and the density of people in a particular location
2. To investigate how the security functions and measures can be used to prevent terrorism attacks in the crowded areas

1.6. Research Questions

1. Is there a relationship between the terrorist attacks and the density of people in a particular area that terrorism occurs?
2. How can the UK security agencies prevent the incidents of terrorist attacks in crowded areas or places?
3. Why do the crowded areas become more vulnerable to terrorist attacks?

1.7. Research Hypothesis

H₁: The density people in a particular place influences the likelihood of a terror attack

H₀: The density people in a particular place does not influence the likelihood of a terror attack

1.8. Contribution of the Study

Notably, this research will contribute in many aspects and inform stakeholders of the security systems such as security personnel, policymakers, the government agencies, event managers, and other researchers. Undoubtedly, terrorism has dire consequences on the economic foundation of the country; therefore, this research will inform the government security agencies to support the counterterrorism measures. The policymakers will also use the findings of this research to formulate new antiterrorism policies and guidelines that enhance reduction of the threats in the crowded areas. Additionally, the research will provide a deeper understanding of the patterns and trends of the terrorist. The patterns illustrate the primary targets of the criminal groups and provide the rationale and proof of the keys targets. That is, this research is exploratory and provides a deeper insight of the why the crowded areas are more vulnerable and less resilient to terrorist activities.

The ultimate contribution of the of the research is to provide evidence-based strategies that can be used to prevent the attacks in concentrated areas such as sports, clubs, parks, and visitor attractions amongst others. As such, it provides the guidelines that can assist the security services to ensure that all public and crowded places are less vulnerable to the attacks (Zineddin & Sherwood 2013, p. 50). The study also helps the public to be vigilant and observant of the security measures that gear towards protecting them from the terror threats. Public information and awareness creation are an important facet of countering terror since informed people are more likely understand and obey the security measures in crowded places. Similarly, this research informs the future researchers by providing the theoretical foundation and statistical basis for preventing the terror threats.

1.9. Research Structure

The paper is divided into five sections that include the introduction, review of the literature, methodology, results and discussions, conclusion. The introduction provides the background information for the study so as to describe the theoretical, conceptual, and practices foundations of the study. The section also provides the knowledge gap of the study and reveals the aims, objectives and the research questions. In essence, the introduction provides the rationale for conducting the study and outline the contributions that that the research will make in reducing UK terror cases. Section two is the literature review that is the assessment and relation of different secondary sources of information about terror attacks (Spiker & Johnston 2013, p. 686). Review of the books, journal articles, and periodicals amongst others that relate to terrorism and antiterrorism issues provide the detailed basis of the study. That is, the secondary information about terror attacks gets reviewed to measure the consistency of this research and identify the research gap. The methodology section explains how the

research design and strategy were structured and provide the justification for the data collection and sampling method used. The section also explains how the data was analysed to approve or invalidate the hypothesis. The result and discussion section provide the illustrations and explanation of the research findings and answers to the study objectives and questions. Finally, the paper gives the recommendations for effective prevention of terrorist attacks in crowded areas. The conclusion summarises all the issues of terrorism mentioned in the previous sections.

1.10. Introduction Summary

In summation, UK is facing real and serious terrorist threats that have over the years pose multiple economic challenges and other consequences. For example, the terror attacks result in damage to property such as telecommunication infrastructures, roads, buildings, nature, and most critically, loss of lives (Sengupta 2015, p. 172). Previously terror cases reveal that most terrorists target the crowded areas that they perceive as attractive. Crowded areas are often highly vulnerable to terror attacks due to inadequate security measures or non-compliances to the security provisions by the public. The section outline some of the crowded places in UK to include sports stadia, worship centres, pubs and clubs, parks, shopping centres, visitor attractions, cinemas and theatres, restaurants, and education institutions (Bakker 2015, p. 291). Objectively, the research aims to reveal why the crowded places are likely to be hit by terrorists. Additionally, the study provides that best counterterrorism measures and services that should be integrated into the process of preventing the terrors. As such, the study will contribute to the security agencies, government security departments, policymakers, and the public amongst other stakeholders to make informed decision concerning terrorism and the countermeasures (Leppard 2005, p. 94). In particular, the study will assist the NaCTSO Bureau to use the best CONTEST provision to reduce the terror threats in crowded places in the UK (Sengupta 2015, p. 173).

2.0. CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Concepts and Theories

Descriptively, terrorism is considered as the violent strategies that terrorist use to provoke the attention of the public. As Morgenstern and Falk (2009, p. 84) noted, the terrorist often hold their irrational motives to invoke political reactions and cause a change in the political orientations of a particular country. Tembo (2014, p. 43) used a mixed research method and found that the criminals use politically aggressive acts and approaches to destabilize the current status of the economy, politics, and other social constructions. Murphy (2015, p.47) explained the terrorism have deleterious impacts on the economy such as destruction of the key sectors that include energy, telecommunication, and the transportation systems. For example, destruction of roads, telecom connections, inflation in oil prices, and expensive restoration costs are some of the harmful economic impacts of the terrorist attacks. Additionally, as Sproat (2005, p. 443) pointed out, many terrorists aim to provoke the political reactions and force political changes to be made in their favour. The politically sparked attacks are often of large-scale and cause massive destructions, injuries, and loss of lives (Sengupta 2015, p. 171). Socially, some terror activities are grounded on the basis of the religious affiliations and socio-cultural beliefs (Fischer et al., 2007. P. 969). For example, some Islamic extremists who misinterpret the doctrines and details of their religion have joined the terror groups and continued to cause havoc in the country.

Terrorist attacks vary in magnitude as some have superficial inflictions while others cause deleterious consequences to the public. According to Sproat (2005, p. 446), most of the terrorists maliciously target crowded areas so as to cause enormous damages to the victims. The ‘success’ of a terror attack is the magnitude of damage that the attacks cause. The unfounded and seamless pleasure of the terrorists is to cause serious havoc and damage to property and lead to mass casualties and fatalities (Taylor & Francis 2015, p. 1). As Morgenstern and Falk (2009, p. 112) noted, main reason the criminals carry out the terror attacks in crowded areas is to involve many victims of the tragedy, which in turn leads to massive destruction, injuries, and deaths. As Murphy (2015, p.36) explained, the crowded areas are very vulnerable to terror attacks since they often lack proactive security measures to combat unforeseen or predicted terror operations. Some terrorists organize the attack over a long time while others spontaneously execute their baseless and seamless attacks. According to Coombs and Holladay (2012, p. 411) the main areas that often become crowded and dangerous without adequate security systems include shopping centres, visitor attractions, cinemas and theatres. Other hotspot areas include hotels and restaurants, education institutions, commercial centres, bus and train terminals, health care institutions, areas or worship, and most critically the sports stadia and arenas (Bakker 2015, p. 297).

Many social scientists have argued about the subjects of terror and counter-terror measures both domestically and internationally. According to Sengupta (2015, p. 172), the danger of terrorism is a global phenomenon that affects many countries politically, socially, and economically. In two decades, the world has been an overall hotbed of terror as many terror groups continue to form and grow. Explicitly, the contemporary period is associated with exacerbated terror activities that mainly target the crowded areas such as shopping malls, visiting sites, commercial centres and sports stadia and grounds. Sproat (2005, p. 452) noted that over the last 20 to 30 years, the UK has been experiencing both sporadic and high-magnitude terror attacks that pose serious and multiple challenges. Statistics reveals that most of the attacks have occurred in crowded places sporting stadia. The UK is well-known for the many sports activities and events that take place; however, the terrorist have taken the

advantages of the events to conduct their mean operations (Leppard 2005, p. 97).

According to Coombs and Holladay (2012, p. 413), the terror incidents can be grouped depending on the incident type, location, and victims of the attacks. As Sproat (2005, p. 449) noted, the incident type measures the magnitude or scale of the terror activity. As mentioned by Coombs and Holladay (2012, p. 415), it is hard to predict the magnitude of a terror attack; hence, the public should always be prepared to for the uncertainty of the attacks. The location of the previous attacks provides the implicit intentions of the criminals. For instance, the current trend where terrorists target the crowded places is an indication that the terrorists in the UK aim at causing the highest level of damages to property and massive injuries and deaths. According to Heath-Kelly (2012, p. 71), the crowded places consist of people who are vulnerable and less resilient to the attack since they are always not prepared for uncertainties of terror attacks. Such operations occur spontaneously and cause unexpected harm and destructions. The victims of terror attacks may also shed light on the intention of the terror groups. Sengupta (2015, p. 183) explained the counterterrorism experts often use the three variables of locations, victims, and incident type to assess and disclose the intentions of the terrorists. Understanding the intentions of the groups is important when projecting the possibilities of the attacks and guide the implementation of the counterterrorism strategies.

Evidently, many terrorist threats and attacks have over the years affected the citizens of UK. According to the Home Office, a security agency, of UK, the terror activities pose significant hurdles to the development of the country (Sengupta 2015, p. 174). Goldsmith (2006, p. 18)'s quantitative study accounted that just after the 9/11 attack in 2001 to the end of 2009, close to 2000 people were arrested in the UK concerning terrorism. Out of that, up to 450 people were charged with offenses related to terrorism and about 240 were convicted. The numbers provide an insight of how the terrorism issue is real and serious in the UK, which inevitably require critical implementation of the best counterterrorism measures. As a result, the British government enacted the 2006 Terrorism Act that outlines the legislative guidelines for dealing with terror cases (Alyami 2015, 6). The Act has also been used to ban organizations and groups that support or engage in terrorist activities.

2.2. The Types of Terrorism in the UK

As hinted, terrorism has over the years presented sustained and serious threats in the domestic and external contexts of the UK. The current terrorists strive to cause widespread and broad-based disruptions, intimidation, havoc, and fear to the people and leaders of the UK (Leppard 2005, p. 93). The terrorists use violence or violent threats to publicise their cause of actions and to provoke the reaction of the political bodies. Mostly, the attackers carry out their operations to motivate their sympathizers, while continuing to intimidate and oppresses the non-supporters (Sengupta 2015, p. 170). Notably, terrorist often try to impose or force the governments to make political changes that only suit them and their sympathizers. In the UK, the previous terror cases have shown that the terrorists aim at influencing or changing the policies of the governments and suppress the idea of democracy (Walker et al., 2011, p. 81). According to the 2006 Terrorism Act, terrorism is defined in the UK as the application of threat in actions to influence the organizations of the local and international governments and at the same time, the public get intimidated and oppressed. The act also acknowledges that the terrorism may occur due to the ideological, racial, and religious difference.

The terrorist threats in the UK are mainly categorized into three. According to Morgenstern and Falk (2009, p. 79), the UK terror can be classified as international, Northern-Ireland-related, and domestic in nature. Outlawed groups commit the international terrorist attacks in

the UK, particularly Al Qaida that has caused unprecedented proliferation of the threats. The Al-Qaida is a global terror group that often carry out attacks of “high impact,” which cause massive casualties and fatalities to the civilians (Walker et al., 2011, p. 83). According to Morgenstern and Falk (2009, p. 41), the international terror attacks in the UK are on-going and serious threats to the public, especially those in crowded places. The qualitative scale of terrorism in the country is SEVERE, which means there is a high likelihood of the occurrence of the terror attacks (Zineddin & Sherwood 2013, p. 53). Islamist extremists cause serious threats to the country and the interests and nationals found abroad. Most of the internal terrorists originate from Iraq and Syria as groups of Al Qaida or the Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Walker et al., 2011, p. 84). The ISIL and Al Qaida have the capabilities and intentions of attacking the West. The global-based terror group like Al Qaida have solicited for a large number of weapons and supporters that give them high chances to attack the UK. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) from the Pakistan continues to produce the Al Qaida members and affiliate groups that aspire to attack crowded areas such as airports and sports stadia and arenas (Leppard 2005, p. 89). The Al Qaida has over the years inspired violence, and other related extremist acts to plot attacks in designated areas in the UK. For instance, the British Islamist extremists often travel to the Arabian Peninsula and South Asia to undergo the terrorist training and return to the UK to cause havoc (Walker et al., 2011, p. 85).

Notably, the majority of the international attacks get plotted by the British residents who understand the country and the soft spots and hotspots (Soldo, Le, & Markopoulou 2011, p. 1426). The terrorists know when and where to stage the attack so as to provoke the highest attentions. According to Heath-Kelly (2012, p. 73), the foreign terrorists collude with the domestic extremists so as to organize and stage the attacks in the most vulnerable areas that might lead to dire consequences. The international terrorists have organized the attacks in conjunction with UK-based extremists and have inherently become harder to detect and project. The groups often use the modern communications systems such as the Internet-mediated media to glamorise the malicious acts and also stimulate the establishment of local-based extremists (Das & Kratcoski 2003, p. 159). Most of the attacks target the crowded areas that are less resilient to the consequences.

The domestic extremists are the groups or individuals that carry out the terrorist attacks or actions that are directed towards pursuing a cause using violent means (Turner 2010, p. 73). In most cases, they aim at changing the legislations or the government policies to their interest. Similar to the international terror attacks, the domestic cases cause serious consequences to the safety and security of the public (Alyami 2015, p.2). In fact, the domestic terrors are often very fatal since the perpetrators understand the critical areas that are crowded and should be targeted. Disorder Intelligence Unit and National Domestic Extremism have established strategic directions to support the intelligence unit and support the police forces in addressing the threats (Soldo, Le, & Markopoulou 2011, p. 1426).

The Northern Ireland has been attributed to terrorist attacks since 1921 (Zineddin & Sherwood 2013, p. 55). Traditionally, the national of Ireland have over the years identified themselves as unionists, loyalists, and Republicans (Soldo, Le, & Markopoulou 2011, 1423). The loyalists support the integration of the Northern Ireland into the Great Britain. Unfortunately, such paramilitary organizations have adopted the extremist styles of terrorism to force the union of the Northern Ireland in the Great Britain (Zineddin & Sherwood 2013, p. 56). Therefore, related terrorist attacks that pose significant challenges to the British interests. Despite the peace-making strategies that were used to avoid the paramilitary actions, some

Northern Ireland republicans still continue to use the terror acts to air their cause of actions. According to Sengupta (2015, p. 164), the unions have realized the essence of targeting the crowded areas so as to invoke government interventions in unionizing the Northern Ireland with the Great Britain. According to Goldsmith (2006, p. 21), all the incident types, or rather, the terrorists target the crowded areas so as to provoke much attention and cause massive destructions.

1.3. The Pattern of the Terrorist Attacks in the UK

According to Goldsmith (2006, p. 23), the crowded places are locations and environments that the members of the access in large numbers. As Heath-Kelly (2012, p. 76) added, the crowded areas are potential targets for the terrorist attacks due to the high crowd density. Notably, crowds have high densities that make it intricate to adequately and proactively institute the counterterrorism measures. According to the NaCTSO the crowded places are found in many locations such as visitor attractions, shopping centres, commercial centres, pubs/clubs, and sporting arenas and stadia. As Goldsmith (2006, p. 19) pointed out, events like open festivals and sporting activities are often temporarily crowded and the; thus, terrorists prefer to conduct spontaneous attacks in such places. Sengupta (2015, p. 174) added that the level vulnerability or the crowded areas depend on their locations, density variables, and the degree of security measures put in place. NaCTSO reveals that both international and local terrorists are more likely to target the crowded places. Heath-Kelly (2012, p. 75) explained that the crowds are often openly accessible, always available and offer a positive prospect for the consequences of the attacks to go beyond loss of people lives. The objectives of most terrorist is to implement mega attacks that surpass the conventional injuries and loss of lives; that is, they aim at causing serious disruptions that must change the economic and political construct of a country (Das & Kratcoski 2003, p. 161).

Nevertheless, as Coombs and Holladay (2012, p. 412) stated, the terrorist may also target the well-protected areas in the UK, but the current trends reveal that they prefer the crowds that are surrogate to lack of adequate protective security. According to Das and Kratcoski (2003, p. 163), the terrorist have adopted a new development scheme to capitalize on lapses of the security and lack of proactive measures against their acts. The criminals believe that the use of improvised explosive devices elicits greater damages in the crowded places that show limited preparedness and lack of pre-emptive response mechanisms (Zineddin & Sherwood 2013, p. 56). The improvised explosives could be in the form of suicide or non-suicidal devices and sometimes hand-delivered. The non-suicidal devices may be directed through the use of remote controls and timers. Therefore, to ensure the 'effectiveness' of the terrorist attacks using the devices, they have deemed it important to define the key targets of the operations (Leppard 2005, p. 88).

Several previous incidences have confirmed the reality the current terrorists mainly target the crowded places. For example, the attacks that happened on Friday 29th of June 2007 at Haymarket in London demonstrated how the terrorists target crowded areas like commercial centres Sengupta (2015, p. 168). In the same year and month on 29th, another attack was staged at the Glasgow Airport on a Saturday, which provided a further alert on the growing trends of the attackers. Tembo (2014, p. 65) commented on the 2007 attacks that the terrorist succeeded in conducting a prior assessment of the security measures in the crowded areas. According to Sengupta (2015, p. 169), terrorists also have their intelligent services to conduct prerequisite surveys of the crowded places to gauge the level of security measures. Any inconvenience and inefficiency in the implementation of the security systems provides the terrorists with an opportunity to execute their malicious acts. As Great (2013, p. 133) pointed

out, the terrorist attacks in crowded areas leads to worst-case scenarios the lead to massive destructions, injuries, and loss of lives. For example, The Hillsborough disaster of 1989 resulted in so many injuries and deaths in a single match. As such it served as a wake-up call for the government, civil societies, security agencies, and organizations, and the public to support the enactment of the security standards. It was very unfortunately and inerasable that the single incident led to 766 injuries and 96 deaths (Sengupta 2015, p. 171).

Therefore, as Morgenstern and Falk (2009, p. 60) argued, the NaCTSO should work closely with the Counterterrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) and the security agencies to beef up security services in crowded areas. The primary objectives of the counterterrorism measures are to detect, delay and deter the incidents of the terrorist attacks. Markedly, detecting the possibility of occurrence of the terrorist attacks is an imperative intervention in countering the incidents. For instance, provision of visual and alarm detection systems are necessary for conducting timely detection and verification of intrusions (Rineheart 2010, p. 1). Again, the institution of appropriate physical security measures should be used to delay the intrusion to an adequate or sufficient time that can allow proper responses to be implemented. Also, detailed crowd management could be integrated into the counterterrorism measures so as to deter the incidents (Turner 2010, p. 70). Deterrence of the terrorist attacks entails the provision of electronic and physical security measures that are sufficient and efficient to address the challenges of the attacks fully. Overall, the counterterrorism is multifaceted and requires the contributions of many stakeholders. The government agencies, civil societies, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, and the public all have a role in countering terrorism (Great 2013, p. 139). As such, they can cooperatively make informed decisions on the allocation of human and material resources required for countering the terrorist attacks (Stewart 2010, p.31). Most importantly as Goldsmith (2006, p. 22) supported, the preventive measures should mainly target the crowded areas so as to detect, delay, and deter the occurrence of the attacks.

3.0. CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

3.1. Research Strategy

The study integrated both qualitative and quantitative method so as to provide enough evidence to support the findings. The qualitative study was mainly used to provide a conceptual and theoretical analysis of terrorism and counterterrorism. Additionally, the qualitative study was employed to provide a deeper understanding of the crowded areas and variables involved (Silke 2001, p. 13). The qualitative study helped in identification of the concepts and variables about terrorism, crowded areas, and the counterterrorism measures. Such detailed analysis of the variables provided a prerequisite for conducting the quantitative study. The quantitative study was important to provide the statistical view of the variables. The quantification of the variables was also essential for carrying out a relational analysis of the variables (Baban 2008, P. 337).

As such, the data was collected and analysed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Both primary and secondary sources were used to collect data and information. Survey interviews, observation, and use of questionnaires were the main instruments used to collect the information (Silke 2001, p. 6-7). Notably, the mixed method strategy was used both in the collection and analysis of the data. It is obvious that the method allowed embedment, connection, and the relation of different data and information from qualitative and quantitative methods (Baban 2008, P. 339).

The research interviews were given to the participants in 6 groups each containing 16 members. The opinions and perceptions concerning terrorism were collected through in-depth focus group interviews. Later after the analysis of the qualitative data, questionnaires were distributed to the same participants in their respective groups. The questionnaire were filled and remitted via emails to the researcher. Periodical phone calls were made to remind the respondents on the need to fill the questionnaires. In sum, the study used a mixed method strategy that integrated both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis (Silke 2001, p. 3). Observations and focus interview were the qualitative instruments used to collect data and information. Qualitative analysis was conducted by relating the findings to the concepts and theories as provided by the literature. Moreover, a questionnaire was the main instrument for collecting the statistical data and information. Statistical analysis such as ANOVA tests or sample mean tests was used to test the hypotheses (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011, 221).

3.2. Research Design

Overall, the study used a mixed research design that explored the concepts and theories of preventing terrorism in crowded areas and backed the concepts with numerical bases. Therefore, a sequential exploratory design was adopted so as to allow systematic study of the concepts and statistical information (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011, 224). By applying the design, the researcher first conducted the qualitative data collection and analysis then followed by the quantitative collection and analysis. The design was important because the initial qualification allowed conceptualization of the research parameters and variables such as location density, security systems, and space, and time (Taylor & Francis 2015, p. 1). The theorization of the variables informed the subsequent qualification. The qualitative study was conducted by interviewing the focus groups who mainly included the security practitioners, officials, and the public.

First, the initial quantitative study was illustrative of the aimed at collecting the opinions and concepts that the research participants had concerning terrorism and counterterrorism in

crowded places. It was also important for identifying the concepts, theories, variable, and descriptive analysis some case studies of terror attacks (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011, 226). Such foundation and understanding of terrorism, counter-measures, and crowded areas made it easy to conduct subsequent quantitative collection and analysis of data and information. Quantification entails assigning of numerical information on the concepts and variables as outlined in the qualitative study. The quantitative analysis also allowed statistical testing of the research hypotheses.

3.3. Rationale of the Strategy and Design

The mixed method was justified for this study since it allowed collection of different data and information to answer the research questions and address the objectives. Additionally, the combined method allowed the use of different analysis methods of the data and information that enhanced reinforcements of the evidence and verification of the analytical methods (Baban 2008, P. 341). The combined method also allowed embedment, connection, and relational analysis of the data and information. Different use of data collection instruments also provided a platform for the verification of the data collected to check the level of consistencies, accuracy, and reliability. According to Sproat (2005, p. 456), the mixed strategy has synergistic benefits due to the integration of the strengths and powers of qualitative and quantitative methods. Metaphorically, if two different fishnets that have holes are overlaid over each other, the 'new net' will be better and with fewer holes. That is, both qualitative and quantitative studies have weaknesses, but can be reduced if the two approaches get combined (Sinai 2012, p. 1).

3.4. Data Collection

As aforementioned, the data was gathered from primary and secondary sources. The secondary sources of data used included journals, books, and articles. The review of previous works provided the theoretical foundation for the research. The literature review was used to measure whether the study is consistent with the previous works and to identify the research gap. The past literature was also used in the qualitative analysis by comparing the findings with the entrenchment found in the previous works. The primary sources also acted as the guiding principles for this research; for example, in choosing the research methodology, developing the objectives and asking the research questions. However, it was also necessary to reinforce the secondary sources with other first-hand data and information.

The primary data and information were collected through observations, in-depth interviews, and use of survey questionnaires. The observations and in-depth interviews were used as the qualitative approaches that were used to gather the opinions and perceptions of the recruited participants. On the other hand, semi-structured questionnaires were used to collect quantitative data and information. The aim of using the questionnaires was to provide statistical ground for the data and information. There were 8 open-ended interview questions and 15 semi-structured questions that were necessary for soliciting for the required data and information about the study. Observations were also used to make a physical observation and assessment of the previous sites of terrorists (Spiker & Johnston 2013, p. 683).

The Likert scale of 1-4 was mainly used to quantify most of the responses of the participants to allow statistical analyses. The In-depth interviews were conducted with 6 groups each with 16 participants. Every group provided their responses to the questions of the interviews and questionnaires. Qualitatively and quantitative responses were integrated and used in combination to analyse the data.

3.5. Sampling Method

The research used random sampling method so as to ensure the representativeness and reduce the biases associated with non-probability sampling. The random sampling technique assigns equal chances to the sampling units so as to ensure that the sample size represents the overall population of the study. Conversely, the non-probability sampling selectively chooses the participants in the research, which results in biased sample group and participation. The overall population for extrapolation the research finding is the UK and even outside the country. Therefore, appropriate selection of the participants using the probability sampling also enhanced the generalizability of the study findings to other contexts.

3.5.1. Sample Frame and Size

The NaCTSO Bureau provided the sample frame from which the participants were selected. The potential participants in the research included the security agencies, government security department, the public, practitioners, and officials (Rineheart 2010, p. 1). All the potential stakeholders of the study that were identified from the NaCTSO website were about 950 individuals. From the sample frame, 96 people were recruited to participate by using clear criteria to guide the inclusion or exclusion of the respondents.

3.5.2. Criteria for selection

The respondent must:

- Be able to speak and write English
- Be 18 years and above
- Be a citizen of UK
- Understand or have experience of the terrorist attacks in the UK

3.6. Reliability and Validity Tests

The reliability measures the consistency of the interventions used during the study, which in turn translates to the final findings. The validity also tests the accuracy of the measure used to as to determine whether they correctly measure what was intended. The ultimate objective of considering the reliability and validity of the measures used was to facilitate the generalizability of the result (Baban 2008, P. 338). Most importantly, the pre-post reliability was used to test the consistency of the interventions and the findings. Both internal and external validities were tested ensure that the measures were accurate and applicable to other contexts. Application of ANOVA statistical tool was important in testing the reliability and validity coupled with an analysis of the findings to test the hypotheses (Muller & Fetterman 2002, p.17).

3.7. Ethical Considerations

The research was conducted pursuant to the ethical and professional principles. The principles require that privacy, security, confidentiality, safety, and confidence issues are primarily considered in the overall methodology of the study (Sinai 2012, p. 1). First, the privacy and confidentiality principles were complied with to ensure that the information provided by the respondents was not disclosed to other people. Also, the security and safety of the research participants was adhered to by ensuring that all the study interventions did not harm the participants. Additionally, the researcher initiated the study by initially creating a good rapport with the potential participants to assure their trust and confidence. Moreover, the professional considerations were observed particularly by acknowledging or accreditation of all the literature review (Baban 2008, P. 337).

3.8. Limitations of the Study

- First, the research strategy required more time and many stakeholders due to the complication and complexity of the studies. The integration of qualitative and quantitative approaches proved to be entailing and time-consuming
- Despite the need to foster effective communication, the selection criterion about the fluency in English omitted other potential participants. Again, the specification of UK possibly limited sourcing of some vital information about other countries.
- The findings of the study were also not very generalizable to other countries outside the UK. Notably, the study was particular in the UK and extrapolation of the findings could only apply to other regions within the country.
- The budget frame of the research was inevitably high due to the choice of the sequential exploratory design that required more funds, materials, and human resources.

3.9. Data analysis

3.9.1. Charts, Figures and Table

Conventionally, the data was analysed using illustrations and tabulation of the results in figures, charts, tables, and other illustrative diagrams. Ideally, the figures and tables were important in providing visual illustrations of the research concepts and theories. The diagrams were very crucial in translating the qualitative information into self-explanatory diagrams, which gives the readers or audience less time and task to grasp the whole ideas in the research. Quantification also reinforced the qualitative representations in terms of numbers expressed as ratios, percentages, fractions, functions, and variations (Baban 2008, P. 341). In sum, the qualitative analysis was integrated with the quantitative analysis so as to provide conclusive evidence for the inferences and discussion of the results (Silke 2001, p. 9).

3.9.2. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)

The data was also analysed statistically using the ANOVA tool. The tool was used to test whether there was a significant difference in the means of the six groups that were treated independently. The statistical study was applicable in the research because the sample size was divided into more than two groups, which led to the need to relate the means of the different sampled groups. In essence, the technique was used to determine the variation of the means of the groups that responded independently. With that, it compared the variation or difference between and within the groups. As Creswell and Plano Clark (2011, p. 235) argued, ANOVA is widely applicable in both experimental and observational studies to test the hypothesis. In testing the hypothesis, ANOVA was used as any other classical statistical test to calculate the F-ratio, which is also known as test statistics. Since the research also involve a quantitative study, it was imperative outline the hypothesis and to provide numerical proof of whether to accept or reject the hypothesis (Muller & Fetterman 2002, p.13). The test statistics was important for this study so as to determine the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis.

The null hypothesis stated that “the density people in a particular place does not influence the likelihood of a terror attack,” which is antagonistic to the thesis of the study. Therefore, through analysing the variations between and within the means, it made it statistically proven to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis. The test was relevant for this study since the variables did not have an intermediate co-factor that influenced their relationship.

Additionally, the analysis was conducted by testing the hypotheses. Chapter one reveals that the study has two main hypotheses that are implicitly related and required closely similar

variables. The hypotheses were tested using ANOVA as a statistical tool to measure the P-value and F-factor that are essential in determining the presence of a significant level. A single-factor ANOVA was used because the sample was divided into different groups. Therefore, the ANOVA was used to determine whether the means of the groups were the same or not. If one of the means is in disparity, then it indicates the presence of error 1, which describes the null hypothesis as false true (Muller & Fetterman 2002, p.19). The disparity in a mean reveals the presence of a significant level ($P=0.05$). If the research's P-value is less than 0.05 ($P\text{-value}<0.05$), then the research rejects the null hypotheses. Similarly, if the study's *F-statistics* is greater than the critical F ($F < F_{\text{crit}}$), then the null hypotheses also rejected (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011, 231-234).

3.10. Summary of the Methodology

The research used a mixed approach by integrating qualitative and quantitative studies. The study employed a sequential exploratory design to conduct qualitative study followed by the quantitative study. The strategy and design elicited advantages like the integration of data, analysis, instruments that led synergistic achievements. Data was collected using three main instruments that included observations, in-depth interviews, and use of questionnaires. Random sampling was applied in selecting participants from a sample frame provided by LaCTSO. The data was analysed using illustrations such as figures and tables that reinforced the theories and concepts of the literature. Statistical analysis was also used to test the hypotheses using the P and F-factors. The researcher made many considerations such as ethical issues, professional considerations, reliability, and validity of the interventions and findings. Despite the few limitations, the research interventions and measures provided the relevant information to address the study objectives and questions.

4.0. CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1. Results

4.1.1. Sample Groups

The sample size was divided into six groups that were given the same interventions or treatments to measures the consistency of the responses. Notably, males and females were selected in the every group. There were 8 male and 8 female respondents in group 1 while both group 2 and 6 had 6 male and 10 female participants. Group 3 and 5 also had similar compositions of 9 male and 7 female participants while group 4 composed of 7 male and 9 females. The inclusion of both sexes avoided the biases of gender, which inevitably improved the reliability of the interventions and applicability of the findings. The allocation of the sample into different groups was done using probability sampling that ensured the representativeness of the groups to the overall sample. The details of the 6 groups and the gender ratio of the participants are illustrated in the figure below.




Fig 1: Shows the Number and Grouping of the Research Sample

4.1.2. Response Rate

The percentage of the responses favoured the progress of the study. The sample groups consisted of a total of 96 responses that were to involve in the research. All the selected participants were eligible for the study; however, only six of them did not respond to either the interview questions or questionnaire. Notably, all the members of group 2 and 3 had 100% response as nobody refused to respond. Only 2 people did not respond in group 4 and 6 and groups 1, and 5 only registered 1 non-response. Empirically, the adherences to the ethical considerations translated into increased cooperation and high willingness of the respondents to actively participate in the research. The summary of the response rate is summarised in the table below.

Table 1: Shows the Response Rates of the Research Participants

Groups	R	NR
1	15	1
2	16	0
3	16	0
4	14	2
5	15	1
6	14	2
Key: R-Response NR-No Response		

4.1.3. People's Trust on the UK Counterterrorism Measures in Crowded Areas

The trust or confidence level on the UK counterterrorism measures was measured both qualitatively and quantitatively. When the non-responses were factored, only 90 responses were many to questions that have a proxy to the trust in the counterterrorism measures. The trust got divided into fourth qualitative measures (low, moderate, high, and very high), which were assigned respective values of 1, 2, 3, and 4. The percentage of the responses got analysed in the pie chart below. Notably, 43% of the sampled members had high trust on the preventive measures of the terrorist attacks in the crowded areas. 31 % of the participants had moderate trust in the system, where they proposed that more facilities, resources, and security personnel need to be deployed to the crowded areas. Only 11% of the responses had low trust on the security services against terrorism in the hotspot areas such as commercial centres and sports events. Also, other areas include clubs, parks, visitor attractions, and some places where people often gather. Additionally, 15% of the respondents asserted that the UK counterterrorism system is complete and comprehensive; thus, they had very high trust in the security systems. It is apparent that most of the people still had no or moderate trust on the counterterrorism measures that are applied in crowded areas. Despite the 43% of people with the trust, most of the respondents only have very high trust on the security systems that were put in place after a terror case. Otherwise, most of them were adamant to say the same about the security systems before the terror attacks that they had experienced or heard.




Fig 2: Shows the People's Percentage of Trust on the UK Counterterrorism Measures

4.1.4. Trends and Patterns of the Current Terrorist Attacks

Fig 3: Shows the Frequency of Scores on the Trends of Terrorism

The qualitative study revealed that most of the respondent (39%) agreed with the statement that crowded places are very likely to be attacked by terrorists. The respondents clarified that crowded place are more vulnerable to the terror attacks. One of the anecdotes of the responses to the interview questions revealed that “terrorists perceive crowded areas as attractive since the concentration of people and property are vulnerable to the attacks.” Another participant also responded that “the crowded places often lack adequate proactive security measures that aggravate the vulnerability of the persons in crowded places. Many other respondents also gave the same or close statements that provided the insight that areas have many people at a time as hotspots for terrorist with the aim to execute mega-attacks. As Sandler (2014, p. 16) mentioned, the terrorists take advantage and target the crowds so as to cause mass casualties, fatalities, and destructions. As noted, 33% of the respondents also agreed that crowded places like sports areas and tourist sites that are spatially confined and contain many staff and fans are vulnerable to the terror attacks. Conversely, only a total of 28% had opposite opinion that crowded places are just the same to areas that are not crowded in terms of incidence and frequency of terror attacks.




Figure 3: The Responses to Likelihood of Terror Attacks in Crowded Areas

4.1.5. Patterns of Attacks in Crowded Areas in UK

Terrorist attacks that were a stage to cause havoc in crowded areas such as sports events, schools and colleges, commercial centres, and visitor attractions amongst others. The study on the previous terrorist attacks on crowded areas revealed increasing incidents of the attacks. The respondent revealed that of the previous cases of the attacks, the crowded places such as football stadia and tourist sites amongst others experience limited or inefficient security systems that bar proper protections. Conspicuously, since 2007, there have been many sporting activities where the respondents experienced or heard of the terror attacks. As such, the illustration of the terror cases in the figure below provide a clue of how the crowded places are less resilient and more vulnerable to the terror attacks. The figure below explicitly reveals that the attacks have steadily increased since the 2001 9/7 terror event.




Fig 4: Shows the Past Terror Attacks in Crowded Areas

4.1.6. Hypothesis Test

4.1.6.1. Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA Tests

Anova: Single Factor

SUMMARY

Groups	Count	Sum	Average	Variance
Group 1	16	42	2.625	1.183333
Group 2	16	36	2.25	0.333333
Group 3	16	22	1.375	1.716667
Group 4	16	35	2.1875	1.3625
Group 5	16	43	2.6875	1.5625
Group 6	16	41	2.5625	1.995833

ANOVA

Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	P-value	F crit
Between Groups	19.09375	5	3.81875	2.809913	0.020986	2.315689
Within Groups	122.3125	90	1.359028			
Total	141.4063	95				

The hypothesis was tested using single-factor ANOVA to determine the p-value and the F-factor. The F-statistics of the research (2.81) was greater F_{crit} (2.32) ($F > F_{crit}$), and as aforementioned if $F > F_{crit}$ then the null hypothesis H_1 is rejected due to the presence of the significant level of difference in the means of the sampled groups (Rutherford 2011, p. 27).

The significant level occurs if the *p-value* of the study is less than 0.05. The study's *p-value* (0.02) that was less than 0.05; thus, the null hypothesis was rejected. According to Muller and Fetterman (2002, p.13) if the *p-value* of a research is less than α (5%/0.05), it shows the presence of a "noise" in the means of the groups. The word "noise" denotes a disparity in at least one of the means of the study groups. Undoubtedly, the statistical analysis of the means was necessary so as to inform the reader why the density of people in a place is likely to influence the occurrence of a terror attack. According to the logics of the ANOVA, the statement that "the density of people in a particular place does not influence the likelihood of a terror attack" is describable as "false true" (Muller & Fetterman 2002, p.13). In sum, the null hypothesis was rejected; thus the study approved the alternative statement.

4.2. Discussions

4.2.1. Research Response

Overall, the response of the participants was good, which allowed detailed gathering of data and information. Notably, only 6 out of the sampled 96 people did not respond, which is even less than 10% of the sample size. The good participation also translated into better results that are generalizable to other contexts. The key to improving the level of participation is to comply with the principles of privacy, safety, security, and confidentiality. It is, therefore, apparent that the study adhered to the principles that stimulated active performance. First, the privacy and confidentiality principles ensure that the information provided by the respondents is not disclosed to other people. Likewise, the security and safety of the research participants ensure that all the study interventions do not harm the participants. Additionally, creating a good rapport with the potential participants wins the trust and confidence of the participants. Over the years, many citizens of the UK fear or worry before giving information about terrorism. Many people have been sceptical before participating in terrorism study. However, this research managed to involve many stakeholders as active participants, particularly because of adhering to the ethical and professional principles (Sinai 2012, p. 1).

4.2.2. Crowded Areas

The results revealed the many people in the UK visit number crowded areas more often. The crowded areas include clubs/pubs, parks, visiting attractions, hotels and restaurants, worship centres, educational institutions, commercial centres, and sports centres (Great 2013, p. 136). About 73% of the respondents agreed that they had visited sports arena and other crowded areas. According to Murphy (2015, p.56), crowded places are often packed, mobbed, or thronged by so many people and property that reduce the effective risk management systems. Markedly, risk management and inspections are very important for ensuring detailed preparedness and early warning systems. Therefore, it is implicit that the crowded areas are more vulnerable to potential risks and hazards. The extent of crowdedness can be measured using the variable of density. Density considers other sub-variables called the area of a location and the number of people in the area. Thus, density measures number/area to provide the quantitative view of the crowd. Crowded areas have a high number of people visiting the location at a time (high density). High-density areas are prone and vulnerable to terror attacks. A presence of a crowd means that space or area cannot accommodate the number or frequency of people attending a particular place. As such, it is inevitable that the security resources, services, and personnel are limited and cannot properly serve the area.

4.2.3. Terrorism and Crowded Areas

Many terrorist attacks that happen in the UK and other countries mainly target the crowded areas. As mentioned, the crowded areas include the entertainment venues that people visit such as clubs, pubs, sports events, and perks. Hotels, restaurants, and convention centres have

also become victims of the UK terrorist attacks (Sinai 2012, p. 1). Other crowded areas include major events that happen such as sports, politics, rallies, and other one-off events (Sandler 2014, p. 17). The crowded areas are linked to the terrorist attacks that happen since the terrorists believe that such places are attractive. Attractiveness of a place to a terrorist means that place is crowded, has no or little security facilities and services, and an attack would lead to 'above-normal' consequences (Sandler 2014, p. 12). The main objective of a terrorist is to inflict pain and massive destructions to the victims and property. As such, the new trend of terrorism in the UK is targeting the crowded places (Hoffman 2012, 15). Crowded places are more vulnerable to terrorism because of the lack of adequate security systems, flawed preparations, and insufficient preparedness to disasters like terrorism. The high density of people and property also reduce the efficacy and effectiveness of the counterterrorism measures. Therefore, the NaCTSO should work closely and mutually with other stakeholders. The stakeholders include the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and the Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) to prioritize security operations in the crowded areas.

4.2.4. Counterterrorism

Terrorism poses a significant threat to the economy, politics, and social constructions in the UK (Fischer, Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, Frey, & Oßwald 2007. P. 966). The impacts of the attacks have always been deleterious to the economy as it seriously affects the key drivers of the economy. The core facets of the economy include transportation, telecommunication, and the energy sector. Therefore, the NaCTSO should work closely with the Counterterrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) and the security agencies to beef up security services in crowded areas. The primary objectives of the counterterrorism measures are to detect, delay and deter the incidents of the terrorist attacks. Markedly, detecting the possibility of occurrence of the terrorist attacks is an imperative intervention in countering the incidents. For instance, provision of visual and alarm detection systems are necessary for conducting timely detection and verification of intrusions. Additionally, the institution of appropriate physical security measures should be used to delay the intrusion to an adequate or sufficient time that can allow proper responses to be implemented. Also, detailed crowd management could be integrated into the counterterrorism measures so as to deter the incidents. Deterrence of the terrorist attacks entails the provision of electronic and physical security measures that are sufficient and efficient to address the challenges of the attacks fully.

Overall, the counterterrorism is multifaceted and demands the contributions of many stakeholders. The government security agencies, civil societies, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, and the public have specific roles in countering terrorism. As such, they can make informed decisions about the allotment of human and material resources required for countering the terrorist attacks. The preventive measures should mainly target the crowded areas so as to detect, delay, and deter the occurrence of the attacks. In essence, all the crowded areas that are attractive to the terrorist attacks should be adequately protected and secured. Cumulatively, the NaCTSO and other relevant stakeholders should ensure that all the crowded places are appropriately planned for through provision of adequate resources, training, and deployment of security systems.

4.3. Summary

In summary, the research did not accept the null hypothesis; hence it supports the argument that the density of a place can influence the likelihood of a terror attack. The study had the aim of eliciting a deeper understanding of the terrorism patterns in the UK with a particular focus on the crowded areas. The research revealed that crowded places that include sports events, commercial centres, cinemas, major events, clubs, parks, and visitor attractions

amongst others are more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Such areas are more vulnerable to the attacks due to the inadequate security measures, limited resources, and overwhelmed security personnel. The study used a mixed research that integrated both qualitative and quantitative approaches to study how the crowded areas are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The results proved that the terrorist threats continue to put the UK citizens at risk

5.0. Recommendation and Conclusion

5.1. Recommendations

- The NaCTSO should identify all the crowded areas in UK and beef up security measures so as to ensure that the areas get protected and prepared for terror attacks. As such, the agencies shall streamline and improve proactive security contingency plans and measures.
- The government should use evidence-based procedures in the allocation of financial, material, and human resources to protect the crowded areas. Security is a free utility that every citizen should enjoy; therefore the government should make informed decisions where planning for the safety of people in crowded areas (Stewart 2010, p.34).
- The event managers such as football organizers should work closely with the security agencies, and the overall security entities to ensure the security and safety of the public are prioritized. The public should also be willing to conform to the counterterrorism measures put in crowded areas.

5.2. Conclusion

In conclusion, UK faces real and serious threats of terrorism that mainly target the crowded areas. Crowded areas are more vulnerable to the attacks due to insufficient protective services. The study used a mixed research methodology to reveal that there is a positive relation between the density of a place and the likelihood of a terrorist attack. The UK crowded area prone to and less resilient to the attacks since the security services are inadequate, and resource requisition is immense (Turner 2010, p. 72). Terrorist strive to accomplish mega attacks that are characterised with the deleterious destruction of property, mass injuries, and deaths. Therefore, the NaCTSO should use the best CONTEST strategies that prioritize resource and security deployment to the crowded areas. In sum, the research aims to inform the policymakers, government and non-government security organizations, civil societies, the private organizations, and other stakeholders about the terrorist patterns to enhance projection and preparedness.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Interview Questions

Interview Number.....

Nationality.....

Sex.....

Age (18-25) (26-35) (36-45) (46-55) (55+)

1. What is your thought about the target of the UK terrorists?

.....
.....
.....

2. Do you think the current threats of terrorism differ from those of the past?

.....
.....
.....

3. Are you satisfied with the current counterterrorism measures?

.....
.....

4. What are some of the best counterterrorism measures that you think should be used to address the terror threats?

.....
.....
.....

5. Do you always visit the following crowded places (Tick all visited)

- i. Sporting stadia and arena
- ii. Pubs/clubs
- iii. Visitors Attractions
- iv. Worship Centres
- v. Parks
- vi. Shopping centres
- vii. Cinemas and theatres
- viii. Hotels and restaurants
- ix. Education institutions
- x. Others (Specify)

6. What are some of the security measures did you notice that aim at protecting the public?

.....
.....
.....

7. Do you think the security services were sufficient to prevent any potential terrorist attacks?

.....
.....
.....

8. Use the following Likert scale to rate the argument that crowded places are vulnerable to terrorist attacks
 1. Very Unlikely
 2. Unlikely
 3. Likely
 4. Very likely

Appendix B: Questionnaire

Questionnaire Numbers.....

Nationality.....

Sex.....

Age (18-25) (26-35) (36-45) (46-55) (55+)

- A. If terrorist were to attack United Kingdom again, where do you think the terrorist would attack? Why?
- B. In your opinion, why do you think terrorist prefer to strike some areas as compared to others? Explain?
- C. Do you think the density of people in a particular area have influence the possibility of being a target to terrorist attacks?
 - 1. Unlikely
 - 2. Unlikely
 - 3. Likely
 - 4. Very Likely
- D. How often do you visit crowded places in UK?
 - 1. Not at all
 - 2. Not Often
 - 3. Often
 - 4. More often
- E. When you last visited the any of the crowded areas, were you satisfied with the security measures in place?
 - 1. Very unsatisfied
 - 2. Unsatisfied
 - 3. Satisfied
 - 4. Very unsatisfied
- F. Are you a victim of terrorism or do you know a person who is a victim? If so, could you rate the magnitude?
 - 1. Feeble
 - 2. Moderate
 - 3. Serious
 - 4. Severe

Questions	Circle your Response			
	Not at all.....			Extremely
G. Do Terrorists target crowded areas?	1	2	3	4
H. Are crowd areas vulnerable to the attacks?	1	2	3	4
I. Are you satisfied with the current counterterrorism measures in crowded areas?	1	2	3	4
J. Do you think new strategies should be adopted to reduce the vulnerability of the crowded areas?	1	2	3	4
K. Do you think the number of people in a place may influence terrorists to attack?	1	2	3	4
L. Do terrorist consider the available security measures when staging the attack?	1	2	3	4
M. Do you think the crowded area can be fully	1	2	3	4

protected from terrorist attacks	
----------------------------------	--

N. According to you, can you highlight the reasons why terrorists target crowded areas?

.....

.....

.....

.....

O. Do you think the UK counterterrorism agencies can prevent the attacks in crowded areas using the current counterterrorism measures? Why?

- 1. Very unlikely
- 2. Unlikely
- 3. Likely
- 4. Very likely

Explain your choice.....

.....

.....

.....

Other Comments

.....

.....

.....

Thank You Very Much for Participating

Appendix C: The One Way ANOVA Statistical Analysis

Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Group 5	Group 6	
3	2	0	3	3	4	
3	3	1	4	2	3	
4	2	3	1	4	3	
2	2	0	3	3	4	
3	1	1	4	2	4	
3	2	2	1	2	1	
0	3	1	3	3	3	
3	3	3	2	0	4	
4	2	2	0	4	2	
2	2	3	2	0	3	
4	2	0	1	4	1	
2	2	1	3	3	3	
3	3	0	2	3	0	
2	2	0	2	4	0	
3	3	4	1	3	2	
1	2	1	3	3	4	
Anova: Single Factor						
SUMMARY						
<i>Groups</i>	<i>Count</i>	<i>Sum</i>	<i>Average</i>	<i>Variance</i>		
Group 1	16	42	2.625	1.183333		
Group 2	16	36	2.25	0.333333		
Group 3	16	22	1.375	1.716667		
Group 4	16	35	2.1875	1.3625		
Group 5	16	43	2.6875	1.5625		
Group 6	16	41	2.5625	1.995833		
ANOVA						
<i>Source of Variation</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>F crit</i>
Between Groups	19.09375	5	3.81875	2.809913	0.020986	2.315689
Within Groups	122.3125	90	1.359028			
Total	141.4063	95				

Appendix D: A Simple Security Checks In Crowded Sports Stadium

